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1 
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
 Christopher Cox is a former United States Representative (R-CA) who, along 
with then-United States Representative (now Senator) Ron Wyden (D-OR), 
authored Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. 47 U.S.C. § 230 
(hereinafter, “Section 230”). Since the law’s enactment, Mr. Cox has been a leading 
observer of developments in the case law and, at the request of the House and Senate, 
a contributor to recent congressional deliberations about Section 230. As the 
principal drafter of the statutory text, amicus is able to speak authoritatively to the 
history of the law, Congress’s intent in passing Section 230, and the importance of 
interpreting the law in accordance with the plain meaning of its words in order to be 
faithful to that intent.  
STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 29(a) 
 No party or party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part; no party or 
party’s counsel contributed money to fund the preparation or submission of this 
brief; and no person except amicus curiae or his counsel contributed money intended 
to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. Both parties have consented to 
the filing of this brief.  
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2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 This is a case about the First Amendment. But in part it also concerns the 
Supremacy Clause, and in particular the power of Congress expressly to preempt 
state laws. Two sections of the Florida statute at issue in this case, S.B. 7072 
(hereinafter the “Act”), contain direct challenges to Section 230, which preempts 
inconsistent state laws. Florida’s argument that Sections 2 and 4 of the Act are not 
federally preempted strains the plain meaning of Section 230’s text.  
 The clear statement of express preemption of inconsistent state laws in Section 
230, the reasons Congress chose express preemption, and the efficacy of that 
preemption under the Supremacy Clause are together the subject of this brief.  
 Florida has claimed that the Act is “consistent” with Section 230 because it 
must. Only “consistent” state laws can stand under Section 230. As plainly stated in 
Section 230(e)(3), “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be 
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”  
 This brief will compare Sections 2 and 4 of the Act with the text of Section 
230, highlighting the Act’s irreconcilable conflict with the operative provisions of 
the federal statute. When the U.S. Supreme Court has found a law’s text to be clear, 
it has buttressed that finding with analysis of the legislative history. See, e.g., 
Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 458–60 (2012). Accordingly, this brief 
will next provide relevant background for understanding the architecture and 
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purposes of Section 230, as set forth in both the text and the legislative history, 
highlighting additional provisions of the Act that are inconsistent with these 
purposes. Lastly, it will describe the applicability of the Supremacy Clause to this 
case, without which not only Florida but every state so inclined would be free to 
engage in “every pretence, under which ingenuity could, by its miserable 
subterfuges, escape from the controlling power of the constitution.” 3 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1839 (3d ed. 1858).  
 To be clear, this brief covers only the partial preemption of the Act by Section 
230 and the applicability of the Supremacy Clause to effectuate that preemption. The 
district court, while addressing the preemption issue, was manifestly correct in 
anchoring its analysis in the First Amendment, thereby treating the entirety of issues 
raised by the Act. While it is unquestionable that Congress, in enacting Section 230, 
intended to encourage platforms to host user-created content without fear of 
crippling liability, Section 230 achieves this result indirectly and in limited ways. 
The breadth of the Act, and the burdens it imposes on Internet platforms hosting 
content created by others, exceed the reach of Section 230. The analysis that follows, 
including the discussion of U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, is therefore necessarily 
supplemental and auxiliary to analysis of the First Amendment issues that are the 
principal focus of the parties and the decision below. 




I. SECTIONS 2 AND 4 OF THE ACT DIRECTLY INTERFERE WITH  
CONTENT MODERATION, IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 230. 
 
A. The Act Prohibits Websites from Enforcing Their Terms of Service 
and Community Guidelines Against “Candidates.” 
 
Both Section 2 and Section 4 of the Act prohibit covered websites from using 
ordinary forms of content moderation in a variety of circumstances if the content 
creator is a “candidate” (as loosely defined in the Act). Specifically, a website may 
not revoke an offending user’s privileges even though the user has consistently and 
flagrantly violated the website’s terms of service and community guidelines. It does 
not matter how reasonable the website’s terms of service may be, or that the 
website’s actions are taken in good faith. Nor does it matter that the “candidate” has 
paid nothing to the website for the privilege of publishing there. Denying free service 
to even multiple recidivists brings fines of $250,000 per day and unlimited exposure 
to civil liability. Act § 501.2041(2)(h). 
This prohibition is in direct conflict with Section 230(c)(2), which protects a 
website in taking “any action” in good faith to restrict access to various categories 
of objectionable material. (Emphasis added.)  
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B.   The Act Prohibits Websites from Moderating Content Created by 
 Any Person “About” a Candidate. 
 
Under the Act, a website may not moderate any content—even illegal 
content—created by any person, if the content is “about” a candidate. Specifically, 
a website may not take down objectionable content, no matter if it is graphically 
violent, racist, pro-Hitler, defamatory, or any other kind of awful material that the 
website, its users, and its advertisers do not wish to associate with. Id. §§ 
501.2041(2)(f), (h). Indeed, the website must not fail to “prioritize” such content. Id. 
§ 106.011(3)(e). 
This provision of the Act stands Section 230(c)(2) on its head. Whereas the 
federal law protects websites that in good faith “restrict” access to content, the 
Florida law requires them to “prioritize” it. Id. (emphases added). 
C.     The Act Prohibits Websites from Taking “Any Action” to 
Moderate Content Created by “Journalistic Entities.” 
 
A website covered under the Act may not take “any action” to moderate even 
illegal content1 created by an “entity,” if the entity meets two flimsy conditions. It 
must have a website containing 100,000 words (i.e., 200 single-spaced pages, which 
need not be current or even authored by the entity—posting a public domain copy 
 
1 The lone exception is obscenity, which a website is allowed to moderate. Id. § 
501.2041(4). 
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of Grimm’s Fairy Tales would suffice). Alternatively, a scant 100 hours of audio 
will do—recordings of one’s garage band apparently meet this trivial requirement. 
And the entity’s website must have a mere 100,000 users over the course of a month, 
or just half that many subscribers (a pittance in an era when Internet personalities 
merely “famous for being famous” routinely garner millions of followers). Such an 
entity automatically qualifies as a “journalistic enterprise,” id. § 501.2041(1)(d), and 
is granted by the Act the unfettered right to post to every “social media” site all 
manner of content, whether or not the content violates the website’s community 
standards and terms of service. Id. § 501.2041(2)(j). 
This wholesale exemption from any and all content moderation is forbidden 
by Section 230(c)(2). The heading for this portion of the federal statute is 
“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material.” 
(Emphasis added.) Contrary to Section 230, the Act forbids blocking and screening 
of offensive material. The federal law expressly forbids the imposition of any 
liability on a website that in good faith chooses to moderate objectionable content 
created by state defined “entities.” Contrary state laws are expressly preempted in 
Section 230(e)(3).  
D.   Under the Act, a Website May Not Rely on Its Own Judgment in 
Determining What Content Is Objectionable. 
 
 Websites covered under the Act are not free to make their own good faith 
judgments about what content is objectionable, violative of their terms of service, 
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and in breach of their community standards. Instead, the Act’s enforcers—the State 
of Florida and private litigants—are empowered to challenge those judgments on the 
ground that they have not been made “consistently.” Id. § 501.2041(2)(b). As the 
Act makes no attempt to define what this means, it becomes a wholly subjective 
standard in the hands of the state—an all-purpose device with which to second-guess 
a website’s good faith determination.  
Section 230 forbids such state laws. It clearly provides that a website is 
protected in using its own judgment in determining whether to restrict access to 
material that it, or its users, consider objectionable. In the exact words of the statute, 
moderation of content “that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable” is 
protected from liability. Section 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
E. The Act Prohibits Websites from Amending Content Moderation   
Policies to Meet Developing Threats. 
 
A website covered by the Act is forbidden to amend its terms of service and 
community guidelines as developing threats require. Instead, it may do so only on a 
schedule set out in the Act. Specifically, covered websites are prohibited from 
changing their “user rules, terms, and agreements more than once every 30 days”—
so if an unexpected crisis, new cyber threat, or novel form of intimidation, 
harassment, fraud, or other objectionable content is introduced, the website is 
prohibited from responding in real time. Id. § 501.2041(2)(c).  
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 Section 230, to the contrary, states that websites are entitled to use their own 
judgment in determining standards for their online communities. Under Section 
230(c)(2)(A), the website, not a state government, is responsible for determining 
what is objectionable. The policy basis for this is expressly stated in Section 
230(b)(2). “It is the policy of the United States,” the law announces, that the Internet 
shall be “unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” But the Act substitutes Florida’s 
own policy and imposes extensive state regulation that contradicts the federal law 
protecting websites’ discretion in adopting their own content standards. 
II.  SECTIONS 2 AND 4 OF THE ACT ARE INCONSISTENT WITH 
SECTION 230. 
 
A. The Structure and Purposes of Section 230. 
Section 230 was written to adapt long-standing legal principles governing 
publisher liability to the new technology of the Internet. It was enacted as part of the 
first thorough-going overhaul of federal telecommunications law since 1934. 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. LA. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).  
The principles of prior law followed from the nature of the communications 
technologies that had occupied the field for decades: broadcast television, radio, 
newspapers, and magazines. What each of these technologies has in common is that 
the content originates from a single source, and is distributed to thousands or 
millions of viewers, listeners, or readers who are passive. The new medium of the 
Internet flipped this model on its head. Now, the number of content creators—each 
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a “broadcaster,” as it were—became nearly the same as the number of users. As was 
apparent even in 1996, the number of content creators would soon expand from 
hundreds of millions to billions.  
It was equally apparent that it would be an impossibility for an Internet 
platform operating at scale to read and understand all of the content that so many 
people were creating every day. Perforce it would be unreasonable for the law to 
require this. Newspapers and TV networks may be held liable for their publications 
and broadcasts because they have a ready opportunity to know in advance what they 
are publishing. Websites hosting millions and billions of pieces of content plainly 
operate in a different environment.    
Congress recognized, moreover, that it would destroy the essential nature of 
the Internet for the law to require monitoring of the vast amount of user-created 
content before it was posted online. What makes the Internet unique is that billions 
of content creators can interact with the entire planet without any intermediation or 
any lag time. In order for censors to intervene, they would have to destroy the real-
time feature of the technology that makes it so useful.  
In adapting long-standing legal principles to this new reality, therefore, form 
followed function. Section 230(c)(1) places responsibility on those in the best 
position to prevent harm: the content creators, who are made liable for any illegal 
content they create. Internet platforms are generally protected from liability for third-
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party content, but with an important caveat. If they are complicit in the development 
of illegal content, even if only in part, the statute offers them no protection. 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 230(c)(1), (f)(3). 
At the same time, Congress was concerned with the dark side of the Internet, 
including ubiquitous pornography, online harassment, fraud, defamation, and scores 
of other pathologies. Two different New York courts had ruled that an Internet 
platform attempting to moderate such content would thereby become unlimitedly 
liable for all of the content on its site, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), while a platform that made no such 
effort would not. Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). The perverse incentive was obvious. To avoid open-ended liability, Internet 
platforms would need to adopt what the New York Supreme Court called the 
“anything goes” model for user-created content. This gave birth to what today is 
codified as Section 230(c)(2), the “Good Samaritan” provisions, which protect 
websites that, however imperfectly, attempt to moderate content on their sites. 
Deliberations over Section 230, originally introduced as a free-standing bill 
in 1995, Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, H.R. 1978, 104th Cong., 
(June 30, 1995), lasted for more than a year.2 When the bill was added to the 
 
2 For a complete history of the provision’s origins and legislative journey into law, 
see Christopher Cox, The History and Original Intent of Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, RICH. J.L. & TECH. (Aug. 27, 2020), 
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Telecommunications Act of 1996 as the Cox-Wyden amendment, following 
enlightening floor debate and nearly unanimous bipartisan support for the careful 
balance it strikes, the vote was 420 yeas, 4 nays. 141 CONG. REC. 22,054 (1995). 
But while this legislative history, including the remarks of legislators during 
debate and the overwhelming support the law received, is certainly of interest, one 
need only consult the statute itself to determine the legislative intent. Section 230(a) 
and (b) set out precisely what Congress had in mind. Unusually, in addition to 
legislative findings, the law includes an ex cathedra statement setting forth the 
“policy of the United States.” This enactment, the product of bicameral legislative 
process and presentment, duly signed into law by President Clinton, is a uniquely 
authoritative statement of the legislative objectives. 
“It is the policy of the United States,” the law states, that the Internet shall be 
“unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” This is not some libertarian manifesto; 
recall that the law was developed after extensive collaboration among Democrats 
and Republicans, many of whom were hardly opponents of government regulation. 
Rather, it reflects their considered judgment that state regulation of speech is 
inherently dangerous. It also reflects the congressional judgment, expressed in 




USCA11 Case: 21-12355     Date Filed: 11/15/2021     Page: 24 of 43 
 
12 
multiplicity of websites is the best way to ensure that the Internet overall will be “a 
forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”  
Today, there are understandable complaints that particular websites moderate 
user content in tendentious ways. But to the extent that a website moderates content 
for purely political reasons, as for example when political party websites prefer 
views they agree with and ban their opponents’ posts, it is not Section 230 but the 
First Amendment that empowers them to do so. Nor does Section 230 protect 
websites from liability for their own speech. Indeed, it does not even protect them 
when they are complicit, even in part, in the development of users’ speech. 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(f)(3). But in part because of the legal certainty around liability that Section 
230 has provided, today there are over 200 million websites available to anyone in 
the United States with a smartphone, and the vast majority of those websites host 
user-created content. This, rather than state-compelled viewpoint neutrality on a 
single platform, is the opportunity for “diversity” that the law was designed to 
achieve.   
B.   The Act Imposes a Duty to Continuously Monitor.  
Section 230 is premised on the fact that it would be unreasonable for the law 
to require websites to continuously monitor the vast amount of textual, graphic, 
audio, and video content posted to their sites around the clock, every day, let alone 
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to investigate the accuracy or suitability of each piece of content, and once having 
done so, then to deal on an individualized basis with the thousands, millions, or 
billions of users who post this content.3 For this reason, as the Ninth Circuit has held, 
Section 230’s protection may not be vitiated based on “efforts, or lack thereof” to 
“monitor, or remove user generated content.” Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 
846, 852 (9th Cir. 2016). Congress understood that liability-driven content 
monitoring and removal would slow traffic on the Internet, discourage the 
development of new Internet platforms featuring user content, and chill 
opportunities for users to publish online as websites attempt to avoid liability.  
 The Act rejects this premise of Section 230. As such, it is an inconsistent state 
law, expressly preempted by Section 230(e)(3). The Act requires covered websites 
not only to continuously monitor the content of their users’ posts, but also to conduct 
outside research into the identities of each user to determine whether any one of them 
might be a “candidate” or a “journalistic entity.” Failure to identify each user will 
expose the website to significant liability, since the Act bars normal content 
moderation for such users.  
 
3 As Rep. White observed during debate on Section 230, referring to Internet 
platforms: “There is no way that any of those entities, like Prodigy, can take the 
responsibility [for all of the] information that is going to be coming into them from 
all manner of sources.” 141 CONG. REC. H8471; see also id. (statement of Rep. 
Goodlatte) (emphasizing importance of not requiring platforms to review users' 
content, calling that imposition “wrong”); id. at H8469 (statement of Rep. Cox) 
(“There is just too much going on [over Internet platforms] for that to be effective.”). 
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Since the Act does not require users to self-identify, the universe that must be 
investigated is the total user base. In the case of “journalistic entities,” the website 
will have to uncover, somehow, whether a user is owned by an entity with a website, 
and if so, what the monthly traffic is to that website; what number of paid subscribers 
it has; and whether the website has met the content volume thresholds in the Act. 
Such data are not normally supplied by users of “social media” or any other websites, 
so the website will be working from scratch.  
The burden is all the greater because the capacious definition of “journalistic 
entity” could include almost anyone. The extraordinary interference with a website’s 
ability to enforce its community standards, not to mention the sheer impossibility of 
the investigatory undertaking, is obvious.  
The same labors of Hercules await the website when it must investigate 
whether its users are “candidates.” Here, too, the Act does not require users to self-
report, placing the entire burden of discovery on the website, and doing nothing to 
limit the field of users who must be investigated.4 And here, too, the definition is so 
lax that it will allow almost anyone so motivated to claim “candidate” status. The 
 
4 Section 501.2041(2)(h) of the Act places an additional requirement on the website 
to provide a means for “candidates” to self-identify, but it places no duty on 
“candidates” to use it. There are no penalties for users falsely identifying themselves 
as “candidates.” Id. In all cases the website will, in self-defense, need to conduct as 
much research into user identities as is reasonably possible, since whether the user’s 
identity as a “candidate” is “known” to the website is the statutory test for liability. 
Id. 
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website thus has to investigate, somehow, whether any of its users has sought to 
qualify for nomination as a candidate for some local office, or to be a write-in 
candidate. And because the user need not have actually qualified to become a 
candidate, but may only have made some attempt at qualification and failed (that is 
all that is necessary under the definition), there may be no paper trail whatsoever to 
identify a user as a “candidate.”5  
Nor is that all the website must investigate. It must also discover whether a 
person has “receive[d] contributions or [made] expenditures,” or consented to 
someone else doing this in their behalf. Under the Act it does not matter that the user 
never filed any report of his or her receipt of contributions, or of the appointment of 
another to collect money.  
And there is yet another way a person can claim to be a candidate: merely file 
papers and take the candidate oath. So websites will have to constantly surveil every 
public repository for documentary evidence that one of their users has done this, and 
then compare this against their entire user base of millions of individuals. 
The burdens of monitoring, moreover, extend well beyond the “social media” 
websites clearly covered by the Act. Section 4 of the Act defines “social media 
platform” to include an “information service,” or a “system,” or even an “access 
 
5 Florida consistently claims in its opening brief that the Act’s provisions apply only 
to “qualified candidates.” State Br., passim. The Act plainly states otherwise.  
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software provider.” Act § 501.2041(1)(g). These very broad categories are not 
themselves defined in the Act, leaving it to the imagination of the state, civil litigants, 
and Internet service providers themselves whether a particular website is, or isn’t, 
covered. Indeed, the definition forswears any limitation to actual social media 
platforms. It expressly states that it includes “an Internet platform or a social media 
site.” Id. (emphasis added). The alternative category of “Internet platform” includes, 
of course, all Internet platforms.  
Many more websites, easily ensnared in the vagaries of the Act’s threshold 
definition because they are an “Internet platform” of one kind or another,6 must 
continuously monitor whether they meet certain activity thresholds. These metrics 
are of vital importance, because they determine whether punishments and civil 
liability await a website that uses otherwise normal forms of content moderation. 
Specifically, websites must measure, on a monthly basis, “individual platform 
participants.” Id. This term is not defined in the Act, and it is different from the 
better-understood industry term “unique visitors.” But even if the Act had adopted 
the industry term, more clarity would be needed, since there is no single definition 
 
6 The Act’s definition of “social media platform” does provide admirable clarity in 
one instance: it expressly excludes platforms “operated by a company that owns and 
operates a theme park or entertainment complex.” Id. 
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uniformly agreed upon in the United States. As a result, conscientious websites are 
at a loss to know whether the Act covers them. Courts will be, too.7  
The Act exposes a website to outsize penalties and unlimited liability in any 
month in which it has 100 million “individual platform participants.” Act § 
501.2041(1)(g). Leaving aside the compliance problems created by the Act’s vague 
definition, the threshold of 100 million “unique users” (using the industry term as a 
stand-in) covers many more websites than what is connoted by Florida’s purported 
targeting of “Big Tech.” For contextual purposes, the nonprofit Wikipedia―which 
appears to satisfy the other elements of the Act’s definition of “social media 
platform”―had more than 2.5 billion unique users as of June 2021.8  
Websites do not have control over the number of visitors they receive, nor can 
a commercial website choose whether to “do business” in Florida (it is, after all, the 
World Wide Web―even for the local hardware store, whether in Cleveland or 
 
7 Distinguishing “unique visitors” from repeat visitors continues to pose 
technological challenges. As users increasingly rely on privacy protections that 
routinely change IP addresses and delete cookies, these measurement tools become 
increasingly prone to overstating the actual number of “unique visitors,” often by 
factors of 200% or more. For background, see generally Max Fomitchev-Zamilov, 
Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on the World Wide Web (2010), 
https://www.academia.edu/44305349/How_google_analytics_and_conventional_c
ookie_tracking_techniques_overestimate_unique_visitors. 
8 Most popular websites worldwide as of June 2021, by unique visitors, STATISTA 
(Sept. 7, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1201889/most-visited-websites-
worldwide-unique-visits/. 
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Madrid). Constant monitoring of “individual users” is therefore essential to ensure 
compliance with the Act. That monitoring is rendered all the more burdensome by 
the inherent difficulty in knowing what it is, exactly, the Act requires a website to 
measure.  
The very reason that Section 230(c)(1) protects websites from liability as if 
they were the publisher of their users’ content is that it would be unreasonable for 
the law to require continuous monitoring of all of the content that thousands, 
millions, and even billions of people post to individual websites each day. A state 
law that requires websites to continuously monitor user activity, the content they 
create, and their offline identities and activities is fundamentally inconsistent with 
Section 230.   
C.   The Act Mandates Individualized Attention to User Posts. 
A further inconsistency with Section 230 is the Act’s requirement that a 
covered website provide, to each user whose content is moderated in any way, an 
individualized explanation—“a thorough rationale,” in the language of the Act—for 
why it determined the content to be objectionable. The explanation must be 
“precise.” Websites must also explain to the user, with precision, how they became 
aware of the objectionable content. If an algorithm was used to flag the objectionable 
content, the website must inform the user of this fact, explain how the algorithm 
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works, and describe how it operated in the particular case to identify or flag the 
user’s content or material as objectionable. Act §§ (2)(d)(1), (3)(c)–(d). 
Furthermore, the Act requires a covered website to respond, on an individual 
basis, to each user who requests information about how many other users have seen 
his or her “content or posts.” Specifically, the website must report to each inquiring 
user the number of “individual platform participants” (again, that undefined and 
technologically elusive term) who were provided or shown content or posts created 
by that particular user. Each user’s opportunity to post content, and thereafter to 
lodge inquiries about viewership of it, is unlimited. So too is the number of times a 
website must respond to each individual user.  
The Act’s mandate that a website not only devote individualized attention to 
each user’s posts on demand, but also that it compile personalized data reports for 
each user on an unlimited number of occasions, id. § 501.2041(2)(e)(2), is a further 
inconsistency with Section 230, which is intended to protect websites from any 
imposition of a duty to monitor individual activity and content.  
D.   The Act’s Definitions Sweep in Far More than “Social Media.” 
Section 230 governs all of the over 200 million websites available to U.S. 
users. Many of these, although no one would consider them to be “social media” 
platforms, are at risk of being swept into the Act’s bespoke definition of “social 
media.” The sheer breadth of the Act’s coverage makes its multiple mandates 
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requiring continuous monitoring of user content and activity all the more 
consequential, and all the more inconsistent with Section 230. 
As noted, Section 4 of the Act defines “social media platform” to include an 
“information service,” or a “system,” or even an “access software provider,” and it 
is explicitly not limited to actual social media platforms. The repetitive use of the 
term “social media platform” throughout the Act, given that these words (but not the 
Act’s re-definition of them) are well understood, disguises the Act’s extraordinary 
reach. By casting such a broad net, Florida has, whether unintentionally or 
purposefully, imposed the Act’s significant compliance costs on many websites that 
are not actually social media platforms.  
The universe of websites that will bear these compliance costs is broader still 
simply because, given the relatively low user threshold and the vagueness of the 
definition, at least thousands of the over 200 million websites accessible to anyone 
in the United States with a smartphone9 will not be able to rule themselves out of 
coverage without persistently monitoring user activity, and in many cases, not even 
then with certainty. The Act’s imposition of a duty to monitor thus extends well 
beyond “social media” and “Big Tech.” While undoubtedly the Act’s sponsors in 
 
9 See How Many Websites Are There?, WEBSITE SETUP, 
https://websitesetup.org/news/how-many-websites-are-there/ (last visited Nov. 9, 
2021). 
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the Florida legislature did not have this objective in mind, gross interference with 
Section 230’s objectives is the result. 
III.  THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE REQUIRES THAT SECTIONS 2 AND 4 
OF THE ACT YIELD TO FEDERAL LAW.  
 
Throughout the history of the Internet, Congress has sought to strike the right 
balance between opportunity and responsibility. Section 230 is such a balance—
holding content creators liable for illegal activity while protecting Internet platforms 
from liability for content created entirely by others. At the same time, Section 230 
does not protect platforms from liability when they are complicit—even if only in 
part―in the creation or development of illegal content. 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), 
(f)(3). The plain language of Section 230 also makes clear its deference to criminal 
law. Id. The entirety of federal criminal law enforcement is unaffected by Section 
230. Id. So is all of state law that is consistent with the policy of Section 230. Id. § 
230(e)(3). 
Still, state law that is inconsistent with the aims of Section 230 is preempted. 
Id. Why did Congress choose this course? First, and most fundamentally, it is 
because the essential purpose of Section 230 is to establish a uniform federal policy, 
applicable across the Internet, that avoids results such as the New York state court 
decision that exposed websites to liability for content moderation. The Internet is the 
quintessential vehicle of interstate, and indeed international, commerce. Its packet-
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switched architecture makes it uniquely susceptible to multiple sources of 
conflicting state and local regulation, since even a message from one cubicle to its 
neighbor inside the same office can be broken up into pieces and routed via servers 
in different states. 
Were every state free to adopt its own policy concerning when an Internet 
platform will be liable for content created by others, not only would compliance 
become oppressive, but the federal policy itself could quickly be undone. Section 
230 would then become a nullity.  
Section 230 thus establishes a uniform federal policy and enforces it with the 
full authority of the Supremacy Clause, in the broadest possible terms: No liability 
may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with Section 230. 
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).  This is express, not implied, preemption; and “inconsistency” 
is the broadest basis for expressly asserting federal priority.  
Florida claims that NCTA―The Internet & Television Ass’n v. Frey, 7 F.4th 
1 (1st Cir. 2021), is to the contrary and supports its contention that the express 
preemption in Section 230(e)(3) must be construed narrowly. State Br. 10. But 
NCTA stands for the opposite proposition. It held that when a federal statute 
disclaims an intent to preempt any state law unless its terms are “specifically” 
preempted, the scope of that preemption is narrower than if the federal statute were 
to expressly preempt every state law “merely if it is ‘inconsistent with’” federal law. 
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NCTA, 7 F.4th at 8.  When Congress uses the “inconsistent with” language, NCTA 
explains, this connotes a more expansive preemption. Id. Of course, this is the 
precise language used in Section 230. Section 230(e)(3) unambiguously preempts 
“any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”  
Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, 821 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2016), the other case cited by 
defendants, similarly does not support the proposition that this court must strain to 
avoid applying the express preemption language of Section 230(e)(3). Arpaio 
repeats the long-established rule that Congress may exercise its power to preempt 
state law not only expressly but impliedly; preemption, the court added, may be 
implied even where federal law does not occupy the field, whenever the state law 
“conflicts with federal law” by “stand[ing] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. at 1103 (internal quotations 
omitted) (quoting Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)).  
The facts in Arpaio required this analysis of implied preemption, because the 
federal statute at issue did not expressly preempt state law. Id. Section 230, of course, 
does expressly preempt state law. Moreover, in Arpaio the federal statute did not 
make Congress’s intent to preempt state law “clear and manifest,” id. at 1104, 
whereas Section 230(e)(3) most certainly does. The congressional intent to preempt 
all “inconsistent” state laws could not be more clear. As drafter of those words, I can 
testify that this is no accident. 
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Arpaio also reminds that “in the First Amendment context,” a facial challenge 
to an overbroad state law will be upheld if “a substantial number of its applications 
are unconstitutional.” Id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 
(2010)). The Act, of course, is being challenged for overbreadth under the First 
Amendment, in this very case. In short, Florida’s assertion that in this case Plaintiffs 
must bear “the burden to establish . . . that no set of circumstances exists under which 
the [Act] would be valid” is simply wrong. State Br. 10 (emphasis added) (quoting 
NCTA). 
The authority and source for Florida’s quoted sentence from NCTA is United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). Salerno stands for the proposition that a 
criminal statute may not be attacked as overbroad “outside the limited context of the 
First Amendment.” Id. at 745 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 n.19 
(1984)) (“Outside the limited First Amendment context, a criminal statute may not 
be attacked as overbroad.”). The Act, of course, is not a criminal statute. Moreover, 
as noted, the Act is being challenged for facial overbreadth under the First 
Amendment in this very case. Among the Act’s First Amendment infirmities is its 
principal inconsistency with Section 230: it directly interferes with websites’ content 
moderation decisions.  
This is hardly a case where, in the words of Salerno, the Act “might operate 
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances.” Id. at 745 
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(emphasis added). In this case, it is certain that “a substantial number of [the Act’s] 
applications are unconstitutional,” which as Arpaio affirms is the applicable test. Id. 
at 1104.  
Moreover, the Act will operate unconstitutionally in all circumstances where 
Section 230(c)(2) applies, because it empowers the State of Florida to interfere with 
every content moderation decision a website makes. Florida argues that the Act only 
applies when content moderation is not in good faith. But the Act provides that 
whenever a website “censors” (using the Act’s defined term), it will always be an 
act of bad faith. Specifically, websites “that unfairly censor, shadow ban, deplatform, 
or apply post-prioritization algorithms … are not acting in good faith.” Act § 1(7). 
Since, as the district court in this case observed, “even a mistaken application of 
standards may occur in good faith,” App. 1710, the Act’s threats of outsize penalties 
serve as an all-purpose weapon against websites whose viewpoints the state does not 
share and deems to be “unfair.”  
Section 230’s plain language establishes that Congress intended to preempt 
not only state laws in direct conflict, but also all state laws that are “merely” 
inconsistent, as the court put it in NCTA. The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST., art. 
VI, § 2, provides that federal law in such cases reigns supreme, “the Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  
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Florida cannot controvert this, and so instead attempts to turn the tables by 
arguing that Section 230 preemption is itself unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment. To make this factitious argument, the State claims that by outlawing 
government censorship of online speech in favor of a marketplace in which 
decentralized private choices govern, Congress in Section 230 deviously managed 
to deputize censorship in the manner of ancient England, where in return for grants 
of monopoly private actors with “complicated ties” to the King carried out 
censorship of “speech unfavorable to the Crown.” State Br. 17 (citing Rossignol v. 
Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 526 (4th Cir. 2003)).10 By such alchemy, we are told, the 
undeniably private action in this case may be converted into state action.  
But rather obviously, neither the 104th Congress that enacted Section 230 nor 
any federal government before or since has had any way of knowing what the 
millions of websites regulated by Section 230 would do with their content 
moderation policies. The government cannot know whether “speech unfavorable” to 
it will be censored, or whether instead it will be amplified. (Experience over the last 
25 years of Section 230 suggests that both have occurred.)  
Just as obviously, the State’s comparison to Rossignol v. Voorhaar is wholly 
inapt. There, the censorship was carried out by government employees. Equally 
 
10 The quotation in Rossignol cited in Florida’s brief is from Fredrick Seaton Siebert, 
Freedom of the Press in England, 1476–1776, at 64–66, 135 (1952). 
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inapposite is Florida’s invocation of Railway Employees’ Department v. Hanson, 
351 U.S. 225 (1956). That case actually explains in unmistakable terms why the 
State’s argument is wrong. In Hanson, a federal statute―not the Constitution 
itself―was the source of the power exercised by private actors. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 
225. Their exercise of power was deemed state action because “the federal statute 
[was its] source.” Id. In such a case, Hanson explains, the “action on the part of 
Congress”―the requisite state action in a First Amendment claim―“is a necessary 
part.” Id. at 231–32. 
In this case, by contrast, the First Amendment itself guarantees platforms’ 
rights to exercise editorial control and to moderate content on their sites. This is so 
with or without Section 230, which is therefore not a “necessary part.” The exercise 
of First Amendment rights by private actors thus remains private action. Far from 
raising First Amendment concerns, facial preemption of the Act buttresses well-
established First Amendment rights and helps protect them from abridgement by 
state action such as Florida’s.  
Accordingly, there is no reason to avoid, and every reason to enforce, the 
command of the Supremacy Clause that Sections 2 and 4 of the Act yield to federal 
law. Enforcement of the Supremacy Clause and the preemptive intent of Congress, 
expressed in Section 230, is necessary to ensure that the uniform national policy 
formally established as “the policy of the United States” is not undermined by a 
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multiplicity of alternative state policies attempting to govern the quintessential 
vehicle of interstate, and indeed international, commerce that is the Internet. 
CONCLUSION 
 For these reasons, this Court should affirm the District Court. 
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